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4 June 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Warning Working Group Meeting - 1 June 1979

The Warning Working Group met on 1 June. [redacted] was present for Mr. Shackley, [redacted]. The Chairman introduced Douglas MacEachin as the new Director, SWS, and Mr. Baraz introduced Mr. Robert Martin as his replacement.

1. The Chairman announced that with NFIB's passage of DCID 1/5 the Working Group was finally in official existence. He noted Mr. Carlucci's announcement at NFIB that he planned to convene his Steering Group immediately following the next NFIB meeting after that scheduled for 7 June, probably 20 or 21 June. [redacted]


2. As background to the DDCI's meeting, the Chairman distributed an excerpt from the classified annex to the HPSCI's report on the Intelligence Authorization Act. He pointed out that the Committee's language appeared to be based on his testimony before Congressman Rose last September, which he thought the Working Group would agree had been overtaken by the way the Working Group had evolved. He planned to explore this with Ms. Lavoy. The Working Group would have to consider whether it should direct some of its business to Mr. Carlucci's Steering Group, as opposed to doing business in the way it had in the past.

[redacted] commented that there was a good deal of unhappiness in DoD over the seeming tendency of HPSCI to tell the Community how to manage its business. [redacted]

3. The Working Group then took up the status of work on the production strategy. It quickly became apparent that through a series of misunderstandings neither DIA nor CIA were in a position to report on their progress. [redacted]

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The Chairman agreed to discuss the security problem with [redacted] and make a recommendation to the Working Group. [redacted]

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5. The Working Group deferred until its next meeting the planned discussion of its future agenda. [redacted]

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6. [redacted] reported that DIA was sending two letters to the WISP Steering Group. The first noted that \$250,000 had been re-programmed for WISP in FY-1980, and stated that the WISP Steering Group meeting in June, scheduled to hear [redacted] proposed order of march, would have to be postponed until a later date. The second letter requested Community cooperation in evaluating the CTS "force package" concept for WISP collection management. There was some discussion of WISP progress and future funding. The Chairman commented that he felt that some intermediate stage was probably needed between the present development process and full funding for an operational system. In this stage, the system would be carried far enough to be tested in real time. He also noted that [redacted] briefing of [redacted] on WISP seemed to have gone well. [redacted]

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
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7. The next meeting of the Warning Working Group will be held at 1315 on Friday, 8 June, in Room 7D32. Its primary purpose will be to discuss what matters it should take up in the next few months.

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Richard Lehman
National Intelligence Officer
for Warning

Distribution:

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X1 In the first instance, we are returning to the traditional role of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence as the DCI's overseer of warning. The DDCI will chair a committee under the National Foreign Intelligence Board on which all the NFIB members who have a major interest in the warning problem will be represented at a senior level. We are not, however, reinventing the old Watch Committee. The mission of the new committee -- it does not yet have a name -- will not, repeat not, be to reach substantive judgments. In other words, it will not itself warn. Rather, it will be the DCI's body for oversight and coordination of Community warning systems. In other words, it will deal at a senior level with what refers to as the process. The committee will probably concern itself on one end of the scale with large problems such as the evaluation of overhead systems from a warning point of view and on the other with a myriad of small fixes that serve to make the system more efficient, such as procedures on the National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Nets.

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Indications and Warning

Finding an absence of a point of accountability for those elements of the intelligence community involved in indications and warning, the Committee in the Classified Annex to last year's authorization bill urged that the DCI establish a focus for warning. Subsequently, in a staff report on warning intelligence and in hearings on intelligence performance on various geographic areas, the Committee has manifested its continued interest in this critical area.

The Committee is encouraged by stronger attention by DIA and the Commands to the management of the DoD Indications System and the establishment by the DCI of a "National Intelligence Officer for Warning." The primary value to date of this arrangement lies in the encouragement of sharper, more critical analysis by analysts and the development of more explicit channels for communicating warning judgments.

However, several of the areas in which the Committee identified a need for more focused management have yet to be fully addressed:

(a) In procedural management, day to day coordination among the Washington area watch centers should be encouraged, and major planning needs to occur in the crisis management area.

(b) Effective interaction within the intelligence community in warning situations requires the ability to evaluate past performance in a broad and objective way, but such capability at the community level is currently lacking.

(c) It is unclear what, if anything, has been done to ensure that warning resources receive systematic review in the resource management process.

In light of the limitations noted above, the Committee requests that the DCI report by December 31, 1979 on: current and planned measures to provide for evaluation of intelligence community performance, particularly in warning situations, and for an understanding of the warning process; the status of the mechanism proposed to the Committee in testimony last September, under which the Deputy DCI, serving as "the DCI's overseer of warning," would chair a committee under the NFIB which would address such major warning related issues as evaluating overhead collection systems from a warning point of view; and existing or planned mechanisms in the resource management process to ensure systematic consideration of whether given expenditures are required for "indications and warning." Such an evaluation must not be limited to the contribution of any one agency, nor merely to analysis, but should examine the effectiveness of the entire intelligence process in providing warning.

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Date(s) 1 June 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief Receptionist

Please provide the following representatives with NFIB conference badges. Their respective agencies have certified their clearances to us.

Time: 1:45 p.m. Room No. 7E62 Subject: Warning Working Group Meeting

NIO Chairman: Richard Lehman, NIO/Warning


Robert A. Martin

State Department

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
NSA



granted for
the request

Please refer questions regarding this meeting to:

Ext.



(When filled in)

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